The Co-movement of housing sales and housing prices : empirics and theory by Wheaton, William C. & Lee, Nai Jia
frssl
MIT LIBRARIES DEWEY]
• /V1(4-|S 3 9080 02874 5187
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Economics
Working Paper Series
The Co-Movement of Housing Sales and Housing Prices:
Empirics and Theory
William C. Wheaton
Nai Jia Lee
Working Paper 09-05
March 1, 2009
Room E52-251
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 021 42
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Networl< Paper Collection at
http;//ssrn.com/abstract=1 353590

4th Draft: March 1.2009.
The co-movement of Housing Sales and Housing
Prices: Empirics and Theory
By
William C. Wheaton
Department of Economics
Center for Real Estate
MIT
Cambridge, Mass 02 1 39
wheaton@mit.edu
and
Nai Jia Lee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Center for Real Estate
MIT
The authors are indebted to, the MIT Center for Real Estate, the National Association of
Realtors and to Torto Wheaton Research. They remain responsible for all results and
conclusions derived there from.
JEL Code: R2. Keyword: Housing

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the strong positive correlation that exists between the volume of
housing sales and housing prices. We first closely examine gross housing flows in the US
and divide sales into two categories: transactions that involve a change or choice of
tenure, as opposed to owner-to-owner churn. The literature suggests that the latter
generates a positive sales-to-price relationship, but we find that the former actually
represents the majority of transactions. For these we hypothesize that there is a negative
prices-to-sales relationship. This runs contrary to a different literature on liquidity
constraints and loss aversion. Empirically, we assemble a large panel data base for 101
MSA spanning 25 years. Our results are strong and robust. Underneath the correlation
lies a pair of Granger causal relationships exactly as hypothesized: higher sales cause
higher prices, but higher prices causes lower sales. The two relationships between sales
and prices together provide a more complete picture of the housing market - suggesting
the strong positive correlation in the data results from frequent shifts in the price-to-sales
schedule. Many such shifts historically occur from changing credit conditions.
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I. Introduction.
As shown in Figure 1 below, there is a strong positive correlation between
housing sales (expressed as a percent of all owner households) and the movement in
housing prices (R"=.66). On the surface the relationship looks to be close to
contemporaneous. There is also a somewhat less obvious negative relationship between
prices and the shorter series on the inventory of owner units for sale (R"=.51). A number
of authors have offered explanations for these relationships, in particular that between
prices and sales.
Figure 1: US Housing Sales, Prices, Inventory
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In one camp, there is a growing literature of models describing home owner
"churn" in the presence of search frictions [Wheaton (1990), Berkovec and Goodman
(1996). Lundberg and Skedinger (1999)]. In these models, buyers become sellers - there
are no entrants or exits from the market. In such a situation the role of prices is
complicated by the fact that if participants pay higher prices, they also receive more upon
sale. It is the transaction cost of owning 2 homes (during the moving period) that grounds
prices. If prices are high, the transaction costs can make trading expensive enough to
erase the original gains from moving. In this environment Nash-bargained prices move
almost inversely to expected sales times - equal to the vacant inventory divided by the
sales flow. In these models, both the inventory and sales churn are exogenous. Following
Pissarides (2000) if the matching rate is exogenous or alternatively of specific form, the
sales time will be shorter with more sales churn and prices therefore higher. Hence
greater sales cause higher prices. Similarly greater vacancy (inventory) raises sales times
and causes lower prices.
There are also a series of papers which propose that negative changes in prices
will subsequently generate lower sales volumes. This again is a positive relationship
between the two variables, but with opposite causality. The first of these is by Stein
(1995) followed by Lamont and Stein (1999) and then Chan (2001). In these models,
liquidity constrained consumers are again moving from one house to another ("churn")
and must make a down payment in order to purchase housing. When prices decline
consumer equity does likewise and fewer households have the remaining down payment
to make the lateral move. As prices rise, equity recovers and so does market liquidity.
Relying instead on behavior economics, Genesove and Mayer (2001) and then Englehardt
(2003) show empirically that sellers who would experience a loss if they sell set higher
reservations than those who would not experience a loss. With higher reservations, the
market as a whole would see lower sales if more and more sellers experience loss
aversion as prices continue to drop.
In this paper we try to unravel the relationship between housing prices and
housing sales, and in addition, the housing inventory. First, we carefully examine gross
housing flows in the AHS for the 1 1 (odd) years in which the survey is conducted. We
find the following.
1). There generally are more purchases of homes by renters or new households
than there are by existing owners. Hence the focus in the literature on own-to-own trades
does ;7o/ characterize the 7?zo/'077(y of housing sales transactions.
2). The yearly change in the homeownership rate is highly correlated negatively
with housing prices. In years when prices are high, flows into renting grow faster than
flows into owning and homeownership starts to decline. When prices are low, net rent-to-
own moves increase as does homeownership.
3). We also examine which flows add to the inventory of for-sale units (called
LISTS) and which subtract (called SALES). Own-to-own moves, for example do both.
We show that the movements in inventory are also positively correlated with price. When
prices are high LISTS increase relative to SALES, the inventory grows, and when prices
are low, the reverse happens.
4). This leads us to hypothesize that there is joint causality between sales and
prices. Owner churn generates a positive schedule between sales and prices as suggested
by frictional market theory. At the same time, inter-tenure transitions should lead to a
negative schedule. Along the latter, when prices are high sales decrease, lists increase and
the inventory starts to grow. In equilibrium, the overall housing market should rest at the
intersection of these two schedules.
To test these ideas we assemble a US panel data base of 101 MSA across 25
years. This data is from the NAR and OFHEO. The NAR inventory data is too scattered
and short to be included in the panel so our empirics are limited to testing just the
hypothesized relationships between sales and prices. Here we find:
5). Using a wide range of model specifications and tests of robustness housing
sales jC>o.s77/'ve/)' "Granger cause" subsequent housing price movements. This reinforces
the relationship posited in frictional search models.
6). There is equally strong empirical support showing that prices negatively
'Granger cause" subsequent housing sales. This relationship is exactly the opposite of
that posited by theories of liquidity constraints and loss aversion, but is consistent with
our hypothesis regarding inter-tenure choices.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section II we set up an accounting
framework for more completely describing gross housing flows from the 2001 AHS.
This involves some careful assumptions to adequately document the magnitude of all the
inter tenure flows relative to within tenure churn and to household creation/dissolution. In
Section 111, we illustrate the relationships between these flows and housing prices using
the 1 1 years for which the flow calculations are possible. We also present our
hypothesized pair of relationships between sales and prices as well as the relationship of
each to the housing inventory. In sections IV through VI we present our empirical
analysis of a panel data set between sales and prices across 101 MSA covering the years
from 1982-2006. It is here we find conclusive evidence that sales positively "Granger
cause" prices and that prices negatively "Granger cause" sales. Our analysis is robust to
many alternative specifications and subsample tests. We conclude with some thoughts
about future research as well as the outlook for US house prices and sales.
II. US Gross Housing Flows: Sales, Lists, and the Inventory.
Much of the theoretical literature on sales and prices investigates how existing
homeowners behave as they try and sell their current home to purchase a new one. This
flow is most often referred to as "churn". To investigate how important a role "churn"
plays in the ownership market, we closely examine the 2001 American Housing Survey.
In "Table 10"of the Survey, respondents are asked what the tenure was of the residence
previously lived in - for those that moved during the last year. The total number of
moves in this question is the same as the total in "Table 11" - asking about the previous
status of the current head (the respondent). In "Table 11" it turns out that 25% of current
renters moved from a residence situation in which they were not the head (leaving home,
divorce, etc.). The fraction is a smaller 12% for owners. What is missing is the joint
distribution between moving by the head and becoming a head. The AHS is not strictly
able to identify how many current owners moved either a) from another unit they owned
b) another unit they rented or c) purchased a house as they became a new or different
household.
To generate the full set of flows, we use information in "Table 1 1" about whether
the previous home was headed by the current head, a relative or acquaintance. We
assume that all current owner-movers who were also newly created households - were
counted in "Table 10" as previous owners. For renters, we assume that all renter-movers
that were also newly created households were counted in "Table 10" in proportion to
renter-owner households in the full sample. Finally, we use the Census figures that year
for the net increase in each type of household and from that and the data on moves we are
able to identify household "exits" by tenure. Gross household exits occur mainly through
deaths, institutionalization (such as to a nursing home), or marriage.
Focusing on just the owned housing market, the AHS also allows us to account
for virtually all of the events that add to the inventory of houses for sale (herein called
LISTS) and all of those transactions that remove houses from the inventory (herein called
SALES). There are two exceptions. The first is the net delivery of new housing units. In
2001 the Census reports that 1,242,000 total units were delivered to the for-sale market.
Since we have no direct count of demolitions we use that figure also as net and it is
counted as additional LISTS. The second is the net purchases of 2"'^ homes, which count
as additional SALES, but about which there is simply little data"". In theory, LISTS -
SALES should equal the change in the inventory of units for sale. These relationships are
depicted in Figure 2 and can be summarized with the identities below (2001 values are
included).
SALES = Own-to-Own + Rent-to-Own + New Owner [+ 2"^* homes] = 5,281,000
LISTS = Own-to-Own + Own-to-Rent + Owner Exits + New homes = 5, 1 79,000
Inventory Change = LISTS - SALES
Net Owner Change = New Owners - Owner Exits + Rent-to-Own - Own-to-Rent
Net Renter Change = New Renters - Renter Exits + Own-to-Rent - Rent-to-Own
(1)
The only other comparable data is from the National Association of Realtors
(NAR). and it reports that in 2001 the inventory of units for sale was nearly stable. The
NAR however reports a higher level of sales at 5,641,000. This 7% discrepancy could be
explained by repeat moves within a same year since the AHS asks only about the most
recent move. It could also represent significant 2" home sales which again are not part of
the AHS move data.
What is most interesting to us is that almost 60% of SALES involve a buyer who
is not transferring ownership laterally from one house to another. So called "'Churn" is
actually a mi)writy of sales transactions. These various inter-tenure sales also are the
critical determinants of change-in-inventory since "Churn'" sales do not affect it. .
The groulh in stock between 1980-1990-2000 Censuses closely matches summed completions suggesting
negligible demolitions over those decades. The same calculation between 1960 and 1970 however suggests
removal of 3 million units.
" Net second home purchases might be estimated from the product of: the share of total gross home
purchases that are second homes (reported by Loan Performance as 15.0%) and the share of new homes in
total home purchases (Census, 25%). This would yield 3-4% of total transactions or about 200,000 units.
There are no direct counts of the annual change in 2"'' home stocks.
Figure 2: US Housing Gross Flows (2001)
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Most inter-tenure SALES would seem to be events that one might expect to be
sensitive (negatively) to housing prices. When prices are high presumably new created
owner household formation is discouraged or at least deflected into new renter household
formation. Likewise moves which involve changes in tenure from renting to owning also
should be negatively sensitive to house prices. Both result because higher prices simply
make owning a house less affordable. At this time we are agnostic about how net 2"
home sales are related to prices.
On the other side of Figure 2, most of the events generating LISTS should be at
least somewhat positively sensitive to price. New deliveries certainly try to occur when
prices are high, and such periods would be appropriate for any owners who wish or need
to "cash out", consume equity or otherwise switch to renting. At this time we are still
seeking a direct data source which investigates in more detail what events actually
generate the own-to-rent moves. Thus the flows in and out of homeownership in Figure 2
suggest that when prices are high sales likely decrease, lists increase and the inventory
grows.
These events would easily generate a downward sloping schedule between prices
and sales such as depicted in Figure 3 below - in compliment to the upward schedule
developed by theorists for owner occupied churn. Figure 3 presents a more complete
picture of the housing market than the models of Stein, Wheaton, or Berkovec and
Goodman - since it accounts for the very large role of inter-tenure mobility as well as for
owner churn.
FIGURE 3: Housing Market Equilibriuni(s)
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III. Further AHS Empirical Analysis.
Unfortunately the gross flows in Figure 2 can only be assembled for the 1 1 years
in which the AHS has undertaken its survey. These are the odd years from 1985 through
2007." In Appendix III we present all of the calculated flows for each of these 1 1 years
along with the OFHEO price index. The number of time series observations is not much
to work with so instead we just illustrate some graphs. In Figure 4, we show house prices
against the calculated change in inventory. This is LISTS-SALES where each of these is
calculated using the set of identies in (1). There is a strong positive relationship [R"=.53].
When prices are high LISTS rise, SALES fall and the inventory grows.
Figure 4: Prices versus Inventory Change (LISTS-SALES)
year
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In Figure 5, we examine the percentage change in the number of renters and
owners in each of the 1 1 years - again with respect to prices. Here there is an inverse
relationship between prices and the increase in owners [R"'=.48] and a positive
relationship between prices and the increasein renters [R~=.29]. When prices are high,
the number of renters seems to rise relative to owners and the opposite when prices are
low. Thus there is a parallel negative relationship between prices and the change in the
Prior to 1985, the AHS used different definitions of residence, headship and moving, so the surveys are
not comparable with the more recent data.
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homeovvnership rate. While these correlations are based on only 1 1 observations - they at
least span a longer 22 year period.
Figure 5: Prices versus Tenure Changes
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2907
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IV. Metropolitan Sales and Price Panel Data.
To more carefully study the relationship(s) between housing sales and housing
prices we have assembled a large panel data base covering 101 MSA and the years 1982
through 2006. "* While far more robust than an aggregate US time series, examining
""There have been a few recent attempts test whether the relationship between movements in sales
and prices support one. or the other, or both theories described previously. Leung, Lau. and Leong (2002)
undertake a time series analysis of Hong Kong Housing and conclude that stronger Granger Causality is
found for sales driving prices rather than prices driving sales. Andrew and Meen (2003) examine a UK
Macro time series using a VAR model and conclude that transactions respond to shocks more quickly than
prices, but do not necessarily "Granger Cause" price responses. Both studies are hampered by limited
observations.
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annual data at the metropolitan level does have a limitation, however, since it cannot use
Census or AHS data. The latter contain more detail about the sources of sales and moves,
but the Census is available only every decade and the AHS sample is just too small to
generate any reliable flows at the MSA level.
For sales data, the only other consistent source is that provided by the National
Association of Realtors (NAR). The NAR data is for single family units only (it excludes
condominium sales in the MSA series), but is available for each MSA over the full period
from 1980 to 2006.' To standardize the sales data, raw sales were compared with annual
Census estimates of the number of total households in those markets. Dividing single
family sales by total households we get a very crude sales rate for each market. In 1980
this calculated sales rate varied between 1.2% and 5.1% across our markets with a
national average value of 2.8%. By contrast, in the 1980 census, 8.1% of owner occupied
households had moved in during the last year. By 2000, the ratio of national NAR single
family sales to total households had risen to 4.9%, while the Census owner mobility rate
just inched up to 8.9%. Of course our crude calculated average sales rates should always
be lower than the census reported owner mobility rates since the former excludes condo
transactions and non-brokered sales. In addition we are dividing by total households
rather than just single family owner-occupied households. Separate renter/ovv'ner single
family household series at yearlyfrequency are not available for all metropolitan markets.
The price data we use is the OFHEO repeat sales series [Baily, Muth, Nourse
(1963)]. This data series has recently been questioned for not factoring out home
improvements or maintenance and for not factoring in depreciation and obsolescence
[Case, Pollakowski, Wachter (1991), Harding, Rosenthal. Sirmans (2007)]. These
omissions could generate a significantly bias in the long term trend of the OFEHO series.
That said we are left with what is available, and the OFHEO index is the most consistent
series available for most US markets over a long time period. The only alternative is to
purchase similar indices from CSW/FISERV, although they have most of the same
methodological issues as the OFHEO data.
' NAR data on the inventory of units for sale is shorter, and available only for only a smaller sample of
larger metropolitan areas. Hence we exclude it from the analysis.
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In Figures 6 and 7 we illustrate tlie yearly NAR sales rate data, along with the
constant dollar OFHEO price series - both in levels and differences - for two markets that
exhibit quite varied behavior, Atlanta and San Francisco. Over this time frame, Atlanta's
constant dollar prices increase very little while San Francisco's increased almost 200%.
San Francisco prices, however, exhibit far greater price volatility. Atlanta's average sales
rate is close to 4% and roughly doubles over 1980-2006. while San Francisco's is almost
half of that (2.6%) and increases by only about 50%. These trends illustrate the topical
range of patterns seen across our sample of 101 metropolitan areas. In appendix I we
present the summary statistics for each market's price and sales rate series. In virtually all
markets there is a long term positive trend in the sales rate, as well as in real house prices.
Figure 6: Atlanta Sales, Prices
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Figure 3: San Francisco Sales, Prices
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Given the persistent trends in both series it is important to test more formally for
series stationarity. There are two tests available for use with panel data. In each, the null
hypothesis is that all of the individual series have unit roots and are non stationary.
Levin-Lin (1993) and Im-Persaran-Shin (2002) both develop a test statistic for the sum or
average coefficient of the lagged variable of interest - across the individuals (markets)
within the panel. The null is that all or the average of these coefficients is not
significantly different from unity. In Table 1 we report the results of this test for both
housing price and sale rate levels, as well as a 2"*^ order stationarity test for housing price
and sales rate changes.
RHPI (Augmented by 1 lag)
T.4BLE 1: Stationarit> tests
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.10771 -18.535 0.22227 0.5879
First Difference -0.31882 -19.822 -0.76888 0.2210
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IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.679 -1.784 0.037
First Difference -1.896 -4.133 0.000
SFSALESRATE (Augmented by 1 lag)
Levin Lin's
Test
Coefficient T Value T-Star P>T
Levels -0.15463 -12.993 0.44501 0.6718
First Difference -0.92284 -30.548 -7.14975 0.0000
IPS test T-Bar W(t-bar) P>T
Levels -1.382 1.426 0.923
First Difference -2.934 -15.377 0.000
With the Levin-Lin test we cannot reject the null (non-stationarity) for either
house price levels or differences. In terms of the sales, we can reject the null for
differences in sales rate, but not for levels. The IPS test (which is argued to have more
power) rejects the null for house price levels and differences and for sales rate
differences. In short, both variables would seem to be stationary in differences, but levels
are more problematic and likely non-stationary.
V. Panel Estimations.
Our panel approach uses a well-known application of Granger-type analysis. We
will ask how significant lagged sales are in a panel model of prices which uses lagged
prices and then several conditioning variables. The conditioning variables we choose are
market area employment, and national mortgage rates. The companion model is to ask
how significant lagged prices are in a panel model of sales using lagged sales and the
same conditioning variables. This pair of model is shown (2)-(3).
P,.r = "o + ^\^,:i-\ + '*2'^/.7-i + P' '"^i.T + S, + ^i,i (2)
s.j = ro + 7, ^,.7--, + r2P..T-^ + ^'^..T + +n, + ^,,t (3)
In our case there is significant concern about the stationarity of both price and
sales rate levels. This same concern should not be present for differences. Hence we will
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need to estimate the model in first differences as well as levels - as outlined in equations
(4) and (5).'
AP, 7. =a^+ a^AP,J_, + a,AS,j_, + jB'AX^j + +S, + s^^ (4)
^..T = /o + rAS,.r-\ + /2^,,r-i + ^'^"^..r + +n, + ^,,t (5)
In panel VAR models with individual heterogeneity there exists a specification
issue. Equations (4) and (5) or (2) and (3) will have an error term that is correlated with
the lagged dependent variables [Nickell, (1981)]. OLS estimation will yield coefficients
that are both biased and also that are not consistent in the number of cross-section
observations. Consistency occurs only in the number of time series observations. Thus
estimates and any tests on the parameters of interest (thea and y) may not be reliable.
These problems might not be serious in our case since we have 26 time series
observations (more than many panel models). To be on the safe side, however, we also
estimated the equations following an estimation strategy by Holtz-Eakin et al. As
discussed in Appendix II, this amounts to using 2-period lagged values of sales and prices
as instruments with GLS estimation. ' .vv , ",'
From either estimates, we conduct a "Granger" causality test. Since we are only
testing for a single restriction, the / statistic is the square root of the F statistic that would
be used to test the hypothesis in the presence of a longer lag structure (Greene, 2003).
Hence, we can simply use a / test (applied to theo:, and y^ ) ^s the check of whether
changes in sales "Granger cause" changes in price and vice versa.
In table 2 we report the results of equations (2) through (5) in each set of rows.
The first column uses OLS estimation, the second the Random Effects IV estimates from
Holtz-Eakin et al. The first set of equations is in levels, while the second set of rows
reports the results using differences. In all Tables, variable names are self evident and
differences are indicated with the prefix GR. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Among the levels equations, we first notice that the two conditioning variables,
the national mortgage rate and local employment have the wrong signs in two cases. The
mortgage interest rate in the OLS price levels equation and local employment in the IV
* In (3) and (4) the fixed effects are cross-section trends rather than cross section levels as in ( 1 ) and (2)
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sales rate equation are miss-signed. There is also an insignificant employment coefficient
in the OLS sales rate equation (despite almost 2500 observations). Another troublesome
result is that the price levels equation has excess "momentum" - lagged prices have a
coefficient greater than one. Hence prices (levels) can grow on their own without
necessitating any increases in ftindamentals, or sales. We suspect that these two
anomalies are likely the result of the non-stationary feature to both the price and sales
series when measured in levels. Interestingly, the two estimation techniques yield quite
similar coefficients - as might be expected with a larger number of time series
observations.
When we move to the results of estimating the equations in differences all of
these issues disappear. The lagged price coefficients are small so the price equations are
stable in the 2"'' degree, and the signs of all coefficients are both correct - and highly
significant.
As to the question of causality, in every price or price growth equation, lagged
sales or growth in sales is always significantly positive. Furthermore in ever}' sales rate or
growth in sales rate equation, lagged prices (or its growth) are also always significant.
Hence there is clear evidence ofjoint causality, but the effect oflagged prices on sales is
always ofa negative sign. Holding lagged sales (and conditioning variables) constant, a
year after there is an increase in prices - sales fall. The is the opposite of that predicted
by theories of loss aversion or liquidity constraints, but consistent with our hypothesis.
TABLE 2: Sales-Price VAR
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
Levels
Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
Real Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
Mortgage Rate
Employment
-25.59144**
(2.562678)
1.023952**
(0.076349)
333305**
(0.2141172)
0.3487804**
(0.1252293)
0.0113145**
(0.0018579)
-1247741**
(2 099341)
1 040663**
(0.0076326)
2.738264**
(0,2015346)
-0.3248508**
(0.1209959)
0.0015689**
(0.0003129)
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Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
Real Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
Mortgage
Employment
First Difference
GR Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR Real Price (Lag 1)
GR Sales Rate (Lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
GR Employment
2.193724**
(0.1428421)
-0.0063598**
(0,0004256)
0.8585273**
(0.0119348)
-0.063598**
(0.0069802)
-0.0000042
(0.0001036)
-0.4090542**
(0.1213855)
0.7606135**
(0.0144198)
0.0289388**
(0.0057409)
-0.093676**
(0.097905)
0.3217936**
(0.0385593)
1.796734**
(0.1044475)
-0.0059454**
(0.0004206)
0.9370184**
(0.0080215)
-0.0664741**
(0.0062413)
-0.0000217**
(0,0000103)
-0.49122**
(0.1221363)
0,8008682**
(0.0148136)
0.1826539**
(0.022255)
-0.08788**
(0.0102427)
0.1190925**
(0.048072)
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR Real Pnce (Lag1)
GR Sales Rate (Lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
0.7075247
(0.3886531)
-0.7027333**
(0.0461695)
0.0580555**
(0.0183812)
-0.334504**
(0.0313474)
1.424424**
(0.3710454)
-0.8581478**
(0.0556805)
0.0657317**
(0.02199095)
-0.307883**
(0.0312106)
GR Employment 1.167302**
(0.1244199)
1.018177**
(0.1120497)
** indicates significance at 5%.
We have experimented with these models using more than a single lag, but
qualitatively the results are the same. In levels, the price equation with two lags becomes
dynamically stable in the sense that the sum of the lagged price coefficients is less than
one. As to causal inference, the sum of the lagged sales coefficients is positive, highly
significant, and passes the Granger F test. In the sales rate equation, the sum of the two
lagged sales rates is virtually identical to the single coefficient above and the lagged price
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levels are again significantly negative (in their sum). Collectively higher lagged prices
"Granger cause" a reduction in sales. We have similar conclusions when two lags are
used in the differences equations, but in differences, the 2"'' lag is always insignificant.
As a tlnal test, we investigate a relationship between the growth in house prices
and the level of the sales rate. In the search theoretic models sales rates determine price
levels, but if prices are slow to adjust, the impact of sales might better show up on price
changes. Similarly the theories of loss aversion and liquidity constraints relate price
changes to sales levels. While the mixing of levels and changes in time series analysis is
generally not standard, this combination of variables is also the strong empirical fact
shown in Figure 1 . In Table 3 price changes are tested for Granger causality against the
level of sales (as a rate).
TABLE 3: Sales-Price Mixed VAR
Differences and Levels Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
GR Real Price
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR Real Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
GR Employment
Sales Rate
(Dependent Variable)
Constant
GR House Price (lag 1)
Sales Rate (lag 1)
GR Mortgage Rate
-6.61475"
(0.3452743)
0.5999102**
(0.0155003)
1.402352**
(0.0736645)
-0.1267573**
(0.0092715)
0.5059503**
(0.0343458)
-0.0348229
(0.0538078)
-0.0334235**
(0.0024156)
1.011515**
(0.0114799)
-0.0162011**
(0.0014449)
-1.431187**
(0.2550279)
0.749431**
(0.0141281)
0.2721678**
(0.0547548)
-0.0860948**
(0.0095884)
0.3678023**
(0.0332065)
0.0358686
(0.0026831)
-0.0370619**
(0.0026831)
1.000989**
(0.0079533)
-0.0151343**
(0.0014294)
GR Employment 0,0494462**
(0.0053525)
0.043442**
(0.0049388)
indicates significance at 5%
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In terms cf causality, these results are no different than the models estimated
either in all levels or all differences. One year after an increase in the level of sales, the
growth in house prices accelerates. Similarly, one year after house price growth
accelerates the level of home sales falls (rather than rises). All conditioning variables are
significant and correctly signed and lagged dependent variables have coefficients less
than one.
VI. Tests of Robustness,
In panel models it is always a good idea to provide some additional tests of the
robustness of results, usually by dividing up either the cross section or time series of the
panel into subsets and examining these results as well. Here we perform both tests. First
we divide the MSA markets into two groups: so-called "coastal" cities that border either
ocean, and "interior" cities that do not. There are 31 markets in the former group and 70
in the latter. The coastal cities are often felt to be those with strong price trends and
possibly different market supply behavior. These results are in Table 4. The second test is
to divide the sample up by year- in this case we estimate separate models for 1980-1992
and 1993-2006. The year 1992 generally marks the bottom of the housing market from
the 1990 recession. These results are depicted in Table 5. Both experiments use just the
differences model that seems to provide the strongest resuhs from the previous section.
TABLE 4: Geographic Sub Panels
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
Coastal MSA Interior MSA Coastal MSA Interior MSA
GR Real Price
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -0,6026028
(0.2974425)
-0.274607**
(0.1132241)
-0.543562
(0.3332429)
-.338799**
.1054476
GR Real Price
(Lagi)
0.7661637**
(0.0255794)
0.7731355**
(0.0178884)
0.855731**
(0.0351039)
.7834749**
.0171874
GR Sales Rate
(Lag 1)
0.0608857**
(0.0141261)
.0094349*
(0.0054047)
0.3475212**
(0.0573584)
.0799289**
.0198759
GR Mortgage Rate -0.106036**
(0,023653)
-.0866954**
(0.0092136)
-0.112101**
(0.0278593)
-0776626**
.008816
GR Employment 0,5717489**
(0.0978548)
.1978858**
(0.0359637)
-0.0434497
(0.153556)
.1617733**
.0381004
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GR Sales Rate
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant 2.098906**
(0.7412813)
0.0396938**
(0.4541917)
3.03388**
(0.7426378)
0.8084169*
(0.4261651)
GR Real Price
(Lagi)
-0.8320889**
(0.0637485)
-0 5447358**
(0.0637485)
-0.9763902**
(0.0798291)
-0.8519448**
(0.0919725)
GR Sales Rate
(Lag1)
-0.0004387
(0.0352049)
0,0770193**
(0.0216808)
-0,0350817
(0.0402424)
0.1111637**
(0.0251712)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.2536587**
(0.0589476)
-0.3772017**
(0.0369599)
-0.2390963**
(00595762)
-0.3323406**
(0.036746)
GR Employment 1.265286**
(0.2438722)
1.172214**
(0.1442662)
1.102051**
(0,2223687)
1.03251**
(0.1293764)
Note:
a) *- 10 percent si
b) MSAs denoted
c) MSAs denoted
gnificance. **- 5 percent significance.
coastal are MSAs near the East or West Coast (see Appendix I).
interior are MSAs that are not located at the East or West Coast.
In Table 6, the results of Table 4 hold up remarkably strong when the panel is
divided by region. The coefficient of sales rate (growth) on prices is always significant
although so-called "costal" cities have larger coefficients. In the equations of price
(growth) on sales rates, the coefficients are always significant, and the point estimates
are very similar as well. The negative effect of prices on sales rates is completely
identical across the regional division of the panel sample. It should be pointed out that all
of the instruments are correctly signed and significant as well.
The conclusion is the same when the panel is split into two periods (Table 5). The
coefficients of interest are significant and of similar magnitudes across time periods, and
all instruments are significant and correctly signed as well. The strong negative impact of
prices on sales clearly occurred during 1 982-1 992 as well as over the more recent period
from 1993-2006. With fewer time series observations in each of the (sub) panels in
Table 7, the Holtz-Eakin estimates are now sometimes quite different than the OLS
results.
TABLE 5: Time Subpanels
Fixed Effects E Holtz-Eakin estimator
1982-1992 1993-2006 1982-1992 1993-2006
GR Real Price
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -2.63937** -0.1053808 -1.237084** -0.2731544
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(0.2362837) (0.1453335) (0.2879418) (0.1943765)
GR Real Price
(Lag1)
0.5521216'*
(0.0271404)
0.9364014**
(0.0183638)
0.6752733**
(0.0257512)
0.9629539**
(0.0196925)
GR Sales Rate
(Lagi)
0.0194498**
(0.0073275)
0.0363384**
(0.0097935)
0.1622147**
(0.0307569)
0.0874362 **
(0.0307703)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.2315352**
(0.0193262)
-0.0707981**
(0.0116032)
-0.1432255**
(0.0244255)
-0.0812995**
(0.0163056)
GR Employment 0.6241497**
(0.063533)
0.4310861**
(0.0501575)
0.157348*
(0.0910416)
0.3441402**
(0.0493389)
GR Sales Rate
(Dependent
Variable)
Constant -6.269503**
(0.9018295)
4.398222**
(0.447546)
-4.898023**
(0.8935038)
3.00473**
(0.4587499)
GR Real Price
(Lagi)
-0.8795382**
(0.1035874)
-0.5704616**
(0.0565504)
-1.080492**
(0.1243784)
-0.4387881**
(0.066557)
GR Sales Rate
(Lagi)
0.0056823
(0.027967)
-0.025242
(0.0301586)
-0.0035275
(0.0350098)
0.066557
(0.029539)
GR Mortgage Rate -0.5636095**
(0.0737626)
-0.1934848**
(0.0357313)
-0.550748**
(0.0819038)
-0.2720118**
(0.0420076)
GR Employment 2.608423**
(0.2424878)
0.4856197**
(0.154457)
2.026295**
(0.2237316)
0.7631351**
(0.1325586)
Note:
a) Column labeled under 1982-1992 refer to the results using observations that span
those years..
b) Coiumn labeled under 1993-2006 refer to the results using observations that span
those years.
VII. Conclusions - _
We have shown that the causal relationship from prices-to-sales is actually
negative - rather than positive. Our empirics are quite strong. As an explanation, we have
argued that actual flows in the housing market are remarkably large between tenure
groups - and that a negative price-to-sales relationship makes sense as a reflection of
these inter-tenure flows. Higher prices lead more households to choose renting than
owning and these flows decrease SALES. Higher prices also increase LISTS and so the
inventory grows. When prices are low, entrants exceed exits into ownership, SALES
increase, LISTS decline as does the inventory.
Our empirical analysis also overwhelmingly supports the positive sales-to-price
relationship that emerges from search-based models of housing churn. Here, a high
sales/inventory ratio causes higher prices and a low ratio generates lower prices. Thus we
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arrived at a more complete description of the housing market at equilibrium - as shown
with the two schedules in Figure 3.
Figure 3 offers a compelling explanation for why in the data, the simple price-
sales correlation is so overwhelmingly positive. Over time it must be the "price based
sales" schedule that is shifting up and down. Remember that this schedule is derived
mainly from the decision to enter or exit the ownership market. Easy credit availability
and lower mortgage rates, for example would shift the schedule up (or out). For the same
level of housing prices, easier credit increases the rent-to-own flow, decreases the own-
to-rent flow, and encourages new households to own. Sales expand and the inventory
contracts. The end result of course is a rise in both prices as well as sales. Contracting
credit does the reverse. In the post WWII history of US housing, such credit expansions
and contractions have indeed tended to dominate housing market fluctuations [Capozza,
Hendershott, Mack (2004)].
Figure 3 also is useful for understanding the current turmoil in the housing
market. Easy mortgage underwriting from "subprime capital" greatly encouraged
expanded homeownership from the mid 1990s through 2005 [Wheaton and Nechayev,
(2007)]. This generated an outward shift in the price-based-sales schedule. Most recently,
rising foreclosures have expanded the rent-to-own flow and shifted the "price based
sales" schedule back inward. This has decreased both sales and prices. Preventing
foreclosures through credit amelioration theoretically would move the schedule upward
again, but so could any countervailing policy of easing mortgage credit. It is interesting to
speculate on whether there might be some policy that would shift the "search based
pricing" schedule upward. This would restore prices, although it would not increase sales.
For example some policy to encourage interest-free bridge loans would certainly make it
easier for owners to "churn". Likewise some form of home sales insurance might reduce
the risk associated with owning two homes. That said, such policies would seem to be a
less direct way of assisting the market versus some stimulus to the "price-based-sales"
schedule.
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APPRENDIX I: Sales, Price Panel Statistics
Market
Code
Market Average
GRRHPI
(%)
Average
GREMP
(%)
Average
SFSALES
RATE
Average
GRSALES
RATE (%)
1 Allentown* 2,03 1.10 4.55 4.25
2 Akron 1.41 1.28 4.79 4.96
3 Albuquerque 0.59 2.79 5.86 7.82
4 Atlanta 1.22 3.18 4.31 5.47
5 Austin 0.65 4.23 4.36 4.86
6 Bakersfield* 0.68 1.91 5.40 3,53
7 Baltimore* 2.54 1.38 3,55 4,27
8 Baton Rouge -0.73 1.77 3,73 5,26
9 Beaumont -1.03 0.20 2.75 4,76
10 Bellingham* 2,81 3.68 3.71 8.74
11 Birmingham 1.28 1.61 4.02 5.53
12 Boulder 2.43 2.54 5.23 3.45
13 Boise City 0.76 3.93 5.23 6.88
14 Boston MA* 5.02 0.95 2.68 4.12
15 Buffalo 1.18 0.71 3.79 2.71
16 Canton 1.02 0.79 4.20 4.07
17 Chicago IL 2.54 1.29 4.02 6.38
18 Charleston 1.22 2.74 3.34 689
19 Charlotte 1.10 3.02 3.68 5.56
20 Cincinnati 1.09 1.91 4.87 4.49
21 Cleveland 1.37 0.77 3.90 4.79
22 Columbus 1.19 2.15 5.66 4.61
23 Corpus Christi -1.15 0.71 3.42 3.88
24 Columbia 0.80 2.24 3.22 5.99
25 Colorado Springs 1.20 3.37 5.38 5.50
26
Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington -0.70 2.49 4.26 4.64
27 Dayton OH 1.18 0.99 4.21 4.40
28 Daytona Beach 1.86 3.05 4.77 5.59
29 Denver CO 1.61 1,96 4,07 5.81
30 Des Moines 1.18 2,23 6.11 5.64
31 Detroit Ml 2.45 1.42 4.16 3.76
32 Flint 1.70 0.06 4.14 3.35
33 Fort Collins 2.32 3.63 5.82 6.72
34 Fresno CA* 1.35 2.04 4.69 6.08
35 Fort Wayne 0.06 1.76 4.16 7.73
36 Grand Rapids Ml 1.59 2,49 5.21 1.09
37 Greensboro NC 0.96 1,92 2.95 7.22
26
38 Harrisburg PA 0.56 1.69 4.24 3.45
39 Honolulu 3.05 1.28 2.99 12,66
40 Houston -1.27 1.38 3.95 4.53
41 Indianapolis IN 0.82 2.58 4.37 6.17
42 Jacksonville 1.42 2.96 4.60 7.23
43 Kansas City 0.70 1.66 5.35 5.17
44 Lansing 1.38 1.24 4.45 1.37
45 Lexington 0.67 2.43 6.23 3.25
46 Los Angeles CA* 3.51 0.99 2.26 5.40
47 Louisville 1.48 1.87 4,65 4,53
48 Little Rock 0.21 2.22 4.64 4.63
49 Las Vegas 1.07 6.11 5.11 8.14
50 Memphis 0.46 2.51 4.63 5.75
51 Miami FL 1.98 2.93 3.21 5,94
52 Milwaukee 1.90 1.24 2.42 5,16
53 Minneapolis 2.16 2.20 4.39 4.35
54 Modesto* 2.81 2.76 5.54 7.04
55 Napa* 4.63 3.27 4.35 5.32
56 Nashville 1.31 2.78 4.44 6.38
57 New York* 4.61 0.72 234 1 96
58 New Orleans 0.06 052 2.94 4.80
59 Ogden 0.67 3.25 4.22 6.08
60 Oklahoma City -1.21 0.95 5.17 3.66
61 Omaha 0.65 2.03 4.99 4.35
62 Orlando 0.88 5.21 5.30 6,33
63 Ventura* 3.95 2.61 4.19 5,83
64 Peoria 0.38 1.16 4.31 6,93
65 Philadelphia PA* 2.78 1.18 352 2.57
66 Phoenix 1.05 4.41 4.27 7.49
67 Pittsburgh 1.18 0.69 2.86 2.75
68 Portland* 2.52 2.61 4.17 7.05
69 Providence* 482 0.96 2.83 4.71
70 Port SL Lucie 1.63 3.59 5.60 7.18
71 Raleigh NC 1.15 3.91 4.06 5.42
72 Reno 1.55 2.94 3.94 8.60
73 Richmond 1.31 2.04 4.71 3 60
74 Riverside* 2.46 4.55 629 5.80
75 Rochester 0.61 0.80 5.16 1.01
76 Santa Rosa* 4.19 3.06 490 2.80
77 Sacramento* 3.02 3.32 5.51 4.94
78 San Francisco CA* 423 1.09 261 4.73
27
79 Salinas* 4.81 1.55 3.95 5.47
80 San Antonio -1.03 2.45 3.70 5.52
81 Sarasota 2.29 4.25 4.69 7.30
82 Santa Barbara* 4.29 1.42 3.16 4.27
83 Santa Cruz* 4.34 2.60 3.19 3.24
84 San Diego* 4.13 2.96 3.62 5.45
85 Seattle* 2.97 2.65 2.95 8.10
86 San Jose* 4.34 1.20 2.85 4.55
87 Salt Lake City 1.39 3.12 3.45 5.72
88 St. Louis 1.48 1.40 4.55 4.82
89 San Luis Obispo* 4.18 3.32 5.49 4.27
90 Spokane* 1.52 2.28 2.81 9.04
91 Stamford* 3.64 0.60 3.14 4.80
92 Stockton* 2.91 2.42 5.59 5.99
93 Tampa 1.45 3.48 3.64 5.61
94 Toledo 0.65 1.18 4.18 5,18
95 Tucson 1.50 2.96 3.32 8.03
96 Tulsa -0.96 1.00 4.66 4.33
97 Vallejo CA* 3.48 2.87 5.24 5.41
98 Washington DC* 3.01 2.54 4.47 3.26
99 Wichita -0.47 1.43 5.01 4.39
100 Wnston 0.73 1.98 292 5.51
101 Worcester* 4.40 1.13 4.18 5.77
Notes: Table provides the average real price appreciation over the 25 years,
average job growth rate, average sales rate, and growth in sales rate. ;
* Denotes "Costal city" in robustness tests.
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APPENDIX II
Let A/7,. = [zip,./.,...., zVP^y] 'and As-,. = [A5'|./.,....,z\5';^j.] ', where iV is the number of
markets. Let W-,. - [e, Apy_, , zlSy^,, , A.^,
^ ] be the vector of right hand side variables,
where e is a vector of ones. Let F, =[s^J.,...,£.^,] betheA^x 1 vector of transformed
disturbance terms. Let 5 = [aQ,a^,a2,J3^,S^] ' be the vector of coefficients for the
equation. ,- ; - _.—
Therefore,
Apr =^^/5 +V^ . (1) '
Combining all the observations for each time period into a stacl<; of equations, we have,
Ap = WB + V. (2)
The matrix of variables that qualify for instrumental variables in period T will be
Zj^ =[e,ApT^-,,As,_,,AX,j], (3)
which changes with T.
To estimate B, we premultiply (2) by Z' to obtain
Z'Ap^Z'WB + Z'V
.
(4)
We then form a consistent instrumental variables estimator by applying GLS to equation
(4), where the covariance matrix Q. = E{Z'VV' Z] . Q is not known and has to be
estimated. We estimate (4) for each time period and form the vector of residuals for each
period and form a consistent estimator, Q , for Q . 5 , the GLS estimator of the
parameter vetor, is hence:
B = [W'Z{Q.y'Z'WY'W'Z(Q.y'Z'Ap. (5)
The same procedure applies to the equation wherein Sales (S) are on the LHS.
29
APPENDIX III: AHS Data (House Price Data from Census)
year 138S 1937 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 20CB 2005 2007
R change 1061 300 414 266 616 -312 116 -65 -53 -181 665 952
change 481 1071 1055 7S2 710 1603 1102 1459 1343 776 978 -221
Nev; Qel. 1072.5 1122.3 1026.3 837,6 1CB9,4 10655 1116,4 1270.4 1241.8 1385,3 1635.9 1216,5
Nev/ 537 553 482 473 557 579 409 430 564 501 641 688
New R 27H 2877 2751 2381 2725 2959 2377 2387 2445 2403 2507 26SS
RR ^25 7438 7563 7485 7184 7714 7494 6934 6497 63 S9 7291 7152
OR 1491 1448 1654 1129 1143 1186 1413 1309 1330 1233 1273 1426
OO IMS 2049 1913 1697 1769 1933 2074 2478 2249 2381 2913 2391
RO 2074 225G 2110 1980 2177 2337 2203 2378 2468 2305 2a)7 2032
Exits S39 295 -117 562 881 127 102 40 359 797 997 1515
R Exits 1143 17S9 1881 1764 1075 2120 1465 1333 1360 1512 508 1123
IjsB 520a5 4914,8 4481,3 4225,6 4 S3 2.4 43S15 47054 5097.4 5179.3 5797.3 eBia9 654aS
Sales laB 4863 4510 4150 4503 4399 4691 5236 5281 S1S7 6161 5111
Price 244.1647 264.3485 27a2473 256.9754 253.5429 253.331 25a 1007 274.0435 295.7802 322.0329 37L4579 337,935
Real Median House
PrKB 1454aai 1S621S7 158258.4 1563S4.1 156S7S9 159199.3 166624.9 175750.3 13^404.1 2030625 232526,1 217900
30
